One More Thing – Regarding Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Comment:  The following excerpt from Notes of a Counterinsurgent is to finally set the stage for understanding this piece as a whole.  Understand the following:

-The piece is a primer

-Countering subversives is a thinking man’s game. 

-Countering subversives often involves out-maneuvering, not out-killing

-Perceptions are just important as reality; shaping them or understanding how they are shaped is important to know and understand

-Limitations and challenges to countering subversion

One More Thing

Notes of a Counterinsurgent is just that, notes. Each insurgency is different, but certain patterns remain constant. This small guide focuses on such patterns; it is designed to be a primer, or a reference, for the counterinsurgent or counter-subversive. If a reader wants to go in more detail, references will be noted in following postings that address key principles noted in this small guide.

There are a number of guides/books today that address the issue of insurgency, counterinsurgency, subversion and counter-subversion. Some books address enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. Other books address advancements in warfare. The constant, however, is that the best weapon of the insurgent and counterinsurgent has comes free and weighs a few pounds- it’s called a brain.

Decisions and actions are based on perceptions, it is the counterinsurgents job to influence, control, manipulate and embed perceptions favorable to his intent. Failure to do so leaves the insurgent to do this against you…he is weak, but if the counterinsurgent ignores the perception issue he will be defeated regardless.

This guide intends to focus mostly on nonphysical issues pertaining to insurgency and insurgent type environments. When we address insurgency in this guide we are also including terrorism, a subset of insurgency, as well as other environments where ambush, surprise and hiding in society is the primary modus operandi.

This guide will focus on mental and moral aspects of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent. The guide highlights important principles realized over many years that remain applicable today, despite changes in technology.

Ultimate mission success in counterinsurgency requires an interagency approach and involvement of the local population, an approach way beyond the tactical operator or analyst to affect. Therefore, the focus of this book mostly on the military/security aspect of the fight in order to help the tactical operator cause shock in a movement and establish initial momentum/dominance. It’s important to know that if the other interagency and population buy-in pieces take too long to follow suit, gains will be blunted and the battle will be prolonged. You will be in a quagmire.

Policy, laws, rules of engagement will impact your ability to affect actions on the ground. It’s important for the counterinsurgent to recognize this, to report these challenges to senior commanders and politicians so organizational adaptation remains fluid, symbiotic and effective. Failure to adapt equates to losing.

This piece closes off with a small observation regarding “US Vulnerability to Strategic Surprise in the 21^st Century”. Despite the title, it is relevant to the Marine, Soldier, SEAL or Ranger on the ground. The counterinsurgent cannot simply worry about being an operator, operations type, intelligence person, politician, logistics person or lawyer…the counterinsurgent must be familiar with all of these spheres, and much more. Thus Situational Awareness trumps what data/insights intelligence or operational reporting may provide you. Perceptions on the ground are more important than reality because reality is shaped by perceptions. What the population believes as reality is more important than what the counterinsurgent knows as fact because the population, via the media, reacts to it.