This piece goes a little further in explain the ‘COIN Triad’. While the ‘COIN Triad’ is not a panacea, it does provide a good mental framework to understand what needs to be done in order to disrupt an insurgent threat.
Understanding the COIN TRIAD
The ultimate aim of the TRIAD is to create conditions for the indigenous population to subvert the insurgency. Each corner element of the Triad is responsible for the following Line of Operation (LOO):
· Conventional forces (Contain the threat)
Cocoon/protect indigenous population from overt insurgent threats/attacks…create a sense of stability and security via heavy presence patrols
· Targeting (Maintain momentum to Disrupt the threat)
Detect, deter, or disrupt hard-core elements. Their goal is to do nothing but to keep the insurgent hardliners on the run.
· Unconventional Warfare forces/advisors (Penetrate/Subvert the Threat)
Guide, coordinate and share information and operations in support of guerillas/indigenous COIN forces so they can undermine the “underground threat" that sustains and drives an insurgency.
The Triad contributes to attacking the insurgent Iceberg below. This conceptual tool to visualize the insurgency is covered in better detail under ‘Anatomy: The “Iceberg”’:
Figure 2 – This Insurgent Iceberg metaphor shows the overt surface threat is small in comparison with the underground threat. Insurgent overt attacks are not decisive, they keep the counterinsurgents attention…to sap the counterinsurgents strength so the underground can continue to infiltrate, and subvert/control society-surface threats are a RUSE. Surface threats are best engaged via heavy presence patrols and population control measures.
The underground threat is the insurgents’ MAIN EFFORT; its center of gravity is the population who sustains the movement; the insurgents’ critical requirement is psychological dominance over the population to compel it to support the movement by force or by compliance. Failure to engage society and underground activities as the overall command main effort will prolong the fight. This is how the insurgent wears down a conventional force... he wears away the counterinsurgents strength and will until he acknowledges defeat by declaration or withdrawal.
More on the TRIAD
(Another Perspective)
COIN forces may want to launch a cohesive three-prong approach to disrupt insurgent psychological dominance over the local environment so other reconstruction and development activities can fill the security and safety void. All three capabilities should reside under one commander in order to concentrate efforts most effectively. The three-prong approach will employ lethal, nonlethal, direct approach and indirect approach measures. This will require assistance/cooperation from other organizations with capabilities, assets and permissions general COIN forces may not have.
COIN forces can conduct overt security operations; the presence of security forces will force the enemy to go underground while the force provides a cocoon of sustained security and safety within the local community as much as possible. COIN forces can collect information that will outline key personalities, key infrastructures and key organizations of the local area so one can develop a picture of the environment and identify true sources of power, influence, as well as friendly and enemy persons. This information can be shared with myriad reconstruction and counterinsurgency agencies. The COIN focus is to provide some type of stability for the local population; this will involve lethal and nonlethal approaches.
A COIN commander can have a separate entity conduct targeting operations against the extremists, ideologues and providers of key capabilities…people whom the populace will not miss, but will feel relieved at their removal. This will involve both lethal and non-lethal approaches. The effect focus is to keep the enemy running as much as possible so he cannot effectively regroup, and so positive infrastructure can begin to develop. COIN commanders can use both unconventional and conventional forces to achieve this objective as conventional forces continue to sustain the cocoon.
COIN commanders can also have a separate entity conduct penetration operations. The intent of penetration operations is to create an environment for plain-clothes indigenous military/security forces to penetrate enemy networks while insurgents are targeted and while insurgents are kept underground by overt military and security forces. Indigenous forces penetrate the underground. Conducting penetration operations will allow COIN elements to maintain a pulse on underground insurgent activity. COIN forces can divert funds, set traps/ploys, gather intelligence and conduct other activities at the behest of forces assigned general overt security operations or targeting activities.
COIN activities should remain discreet, fluid to foment dissonance and distrust within the insurgent organization. This will involve lethal and nonlethal approaches.
There needs to be a central fusion center that measures/monitors the effectiveness of all elements of the previously mentioned lines of operation to ensure there is synergy of effort rather than everyone simply operating on their own and confusing the overall end state and perspectives of the COIN effort.
Disrupting the insurgents’ psychological control over the local population provides opportunities for positive actors of some type to stand in the insurgents’ place who can then lead the people and rebuild society to a functional state or community. COIN forces need to employ such a triad, this is a must; without it momentum favors the enemy.
Fear is the tool insurgents use to dominate his environment.
Fear is leveraged to force compliance. Fear turns passive actors and fence sitters into adequate supporters to insurgent warfighting capabilities.
Subverting the insurgents’ psychological grip will undermine his ability to:
· Gather intelligence against locals, the local environment, in addition to counterinsurgent forces
· Effectively sustain operations. It is understood most insurgents are volunteers, part-timers and profiteers.
· Forcing insurgents to go underground disrupts their operational capability
· Remain a cohesive organization since he will not know who to trust; command, control and compliance will be difficult
· Maneuver
· Maintain safe havens
· Communicate via trustworthy assets
Policies need to be in place to limit recidivism because if the indigenous population cannot trust COIN forces to protect them, they will side with the insurgent. If such policies do not exist, one should inform their chain of command so national level policies can be created and implemented.
The bottom line is that COIN success cannot be achieved without indigenous COIN forces. This is what is meant in the COIN Triad diagram by dropping the ego and we win by proxy. COIN forces normally cannot directly win the fight, but they CAN directly lose it. COIN forces should be viewed as a tool to enable the indigenous population to win. COIN forces win when the people run their own society without COIN forces. Additionally, if COIN forces take credit for the overall success, then they insult the population who may revolt out of the shame of taking their honor away. This is important in some cultures because some cultures fight and die simply for their honor.
This does not bode well for a force who is already seen as a foreigner in that the COIN force may make itself viewed as an occupation force whereby one just increased insurgent numbers and solidified a cause.
ALWAYS seek ways to use the insurgent’s energy against himself by fomenting distrust within the movement and its supporting population to cause infighting; penetrating the underground on allows one to do this. YOU CAN COUNT ON THE INSURGENT DOING THIS TO YOU.
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