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Monday, October 31, 2011

Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers

Comment: Hopefully this is the lead into a major operation to put the cartels on the run. Over the weekend, a group of hackers threatened to expose cartel members, as well as local and authorities colluding with cartel activities.

Excerpt:
Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers

Published October 31, 2011

Mexico City - Soldiers seized communications equipment being used by drug traffickers in Reynosa, a border city in the northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas, the army said.
The telecommunications gear was seized on Oct. 11 and Oct. 25 by army patrols, the 4th Military Region command said, without identifying the criminal organization operating the network.

A total of 21 antennas, 22 repeaters, 18 duplexers, eight filters and three transceivers were seized.

The telecom network was dismantled as part of the government's "Operation Northeast" targeting drug traffickers and other organized crime groups, the army said.

Marines dismantled an encrypted communications network last month being used by the Los Zetas drug cartel in 10 cities in the Gulf state of Veracruz.

The network employed 12 antennas, computers, radio transmitters, scanners, thousands of feet of cable, cell phones, decoders and solar panels.

The Gulf cartel and Los Zetas have been waging a brutal turf war in Tamaulipas that has left hundreds of people dead since last year.

The two drug trafficking organizations are trying to gain control of smuggling routes into the United States.

...

A total of 15,270 people died in drug-related violence in Mexico last year, and more than 40,000 people have died since President Felipe Calderon declared war on the country's cartels shortly after taking office in December 2006.

Source:
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/10/31/soldiers-dismantle-telecom-network-used-by-mexican-traffickers/

Saturday, October 29, 2011

Targeting Opportunity - Disrupt Insurgent Psychological Dominance – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

 

Comment:  Disrupting the cartels will require a holistic effort focused on keeping the cartels on the run.  Either government security forces or local watch groups need to implement an overt and persistent security presence that will limit cartel freedom of movement.  The intent of this effort is for physical security, but even more for perceptual reasons so the population can begin trusting a local legitimate security force.  Legitimate may be legal, but legal could also be termed as commonly acceptable when the interests of the people are assured.  Such efforts will hopefully force cartel activities underground and thus possibly mitigate their psychological grip on the population. 

Note, however, such an overt force may not be safe enough to surface.  Therefore another simultaneous action may need to occur; that is for the government and/or locally accepted security forces to run high op-tempo lethal and non-lethal measures to disrupt the physical and psychological grip the cartels may have on the local population.  By ramping up the tempo, the cartels will find themselves in react mode, unable to rest, clearly think, unable to trust each other…tensions can run high within the local cartel movement. 

Again, while the other above two actions are occurring, the third element needs to be affected; infiltrating the cartel network either directly or through their close associates, friends and/or families.  The triad is an interwoven cyclic effort that can be used to put pressure on the cartels from myriad directions.  However, all of this will be for naught if an effective form of governance is not established in order to exploit the social void.  If the void is left open, then the cycle of violence…tit versus tat will only continue and the legitimacy of the government will be in question.

At the bottom of this post you will see how Mexicans can launch such an attack against the cartels.  In the below real-life vignette just posted today by the Houston Chronicle, an on-line hacker group threatens to expose the identities and locations of cartel members if the cartels do not release one of their compadres who was abducted by the cartels.

What if US and Mexican Law Enforcement were able to get the hackers to cooperate and provide that information to both governments?

Note, there is a lot of opportunity Mexicans can exploit here so they can target the cartel using the model posted below.  If on-line activism can cause the Arab Spring which toppled and/or shook the governments of at least five nations, then surely online hackers and activists can attack the cartels and expose information that can allow government forces to target them.

Disrupt Insurgent Psychological Dominance

Three, sustained, fundamental activities HAVE TO OCCUR (COIN Triad) for insurgent influence to wane and/or dissipate long enough so governance can be established.

· Cocoon the population

· Run a high op-tempo lethal and non-lethal targeting effort

· Most important, create, mobilize and sustain an overt and surreptitious cell of locals to subvert the insurgent movement. This effort constitutes a TRIAD.

All lethal, non-lethal, intelligence, intelligence operations and collection efforts, civil affairs, political, humanitarian activities must follow along these lines of operation in order to serve as a catalyst for a small minority to become the tipping point for a populace driven counterinsurgency movement.

The British did this in the 50s and 60s in Malaysia and Africa via pseudo gangs and Special Branch where the Brits infiltrated gangs or created fake gangs in order to subvert other gangs.  The Sunni Iraqis and US did this in 2006 through the Awakening Movement and “Desert Protection Force”; some elements of the Afghan population initiated similar efforts in 2008/2009.

Triad

Figure 1 Graphic illustrates the "three prong" approach to disrupting insurgent psychological dominance of the battle space. Conventional forces stabilize; Special Operations and Targeting forces keep the enemy on the run on the surface and in the underground; Unconventional forces exploit the dissonance caused by targeting operations to penetrate the underground, exploit societal seams and subvert the insurgency from the inside out.

Here is a potential real-life vignette and OPPORTUNITY where Mexicans and the Government of Mexico can coordinate with this reported hacker group and attack the cartel.  If the people, governments of Mexico and the US can unite with these hackers, then maybe they can gain access into the names, locations and whereabouts that can facilitate the targeting of the cartel members mentioned in the video and article below. 

The following piece represents

extraordinary opportunity

if exploited.

 

Online hackers threaten to expose cartel's secrets

Group called Anonymous demands release of one of their own who was kidnapped

 

By DANE SCHILLER, HOUSTON CHRONICLE

 

Updated 04:09 p.m., Saturday, October 29, 2011

An international group of online hackers is warning a Mexican drug cartel to release one of its members, kidnapped from a street protest, or it will publish the identities and addresses of the syndicate's associates, from corrupt police to taxi drivers, as well as reveal the syndicates' businesses.

The vow is a bizarre cyber twist to Mexico's ongoing drug war, as a group that has no guns is squaring off against the Zetas, a cartel blamed for thousands of deaths as well as introducing beheadings and other frightening brutality.

"You made a huge mistake by taking one of us. Release him," says a masked man in a video posted online on behalf of the group, Anonymous.

"We cannot defend ourselves with a weapon … but we can do this with their cars, homes, bars, brothels and everything else in their possession," says the man, who is wearing a suit and tie.

"It won't be difficult; we all know who they are and where they are located," says the man, who underlines the group's international ties by speaking Spanish with the accent of a Spaniard while using Mexican slang.

He also implies that the group will expose mainstream journalists who are somehow in cahoots with the Zetas by writing negative articles about the military, the country's biggest fist in the drug war.

"We demand his release," says the Anonymous spokesman, who is wearing a mask like the one worn by the shadowy revolutionary character in the movie V for Vendetta, which came out in 2006. "If anything happens to him, you sons of (expletive) will always remember this upcoming November 5."

The person reportedly kidnapped is not named, and the video does not share information about the kidnapping other than that it occurred in the Mexican state of Veracruz during a street protest.

Anonymous draws its roots from an online forum dedicated to bringing sensitive government documents and other material to light.

If Anonymous can make good on its threats to publish names, it will "most certainly" lead to more deaths and could leave bloggers and others open to reprisal attacks by the cartel, contends Stratfor, an Austin-based global intelligence company.

"In this viral world on the Internet, it shows how much damage could be done with just one statement on the Web," said Fred Burton of Stratfor, which published a report Friday that probes the implications of the cartel drawing the activists' ire.

Mike Vigil, the retired head of international operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration, said the Zetas must take Anonymous seriously.

"It is a gutsy move," Vigil said. "By publishing the names, they identify them to rivals, and trust me, they will go after them."

dane.schiller@chron.com

Article source:  Online hackers threaten to expose cartel's secrets

Related posts:

Friday, October 28, 2011

Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Comment:  Again, the following piece is insurgency/counterinsurgency focused, but still very relevant to the cartel problem in Mexico.  The cartels are using violence in order to pit the population between the cartels and the government.  Additionally, the cartels are better able to reinforce their control because they will simply kill you, whereas the government will try to detain you and has no death penalty- this enhances the cartels ability to have the stronger voice in controlling the population.  Ergo, the population is the security blanket.  Until the population realizes this, they will continue to be played.  It is for this very reason why vigilante groups, while potentially dangerous, can be used to effectively disrupt the cartel’s psychological grip on the population.


Whoever Dominates the Psychological Environment controls the fight.  Therefore, one may seriously need to consider fighting back, or risk being a pawn in the drug war game. 
Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment



“In war the moral is to the material three to one”
-Napoleon


Whoever dominates the psychological terrain controls the fight. Counterinsurgent (COIN) forces want to dominate this terrain-it influences the population to choose a side - the insurgent or counterinsurgent.


Winning and security is based more on perception vice reality. Enemies of western powers understand national power is really more of an image in that the full might of military power is restricted from being fully implemented due to internal and international pressures-this gives insurgents the will to prevail.


From a “SO WHAT” perspective, enemies of western powers understand they can win by draining resolve to continue the fight. Western powers have large, obese and lethargic bureaucratic processes that render them quite useless- this makes time an insurgent weapon. Western powers have internal competing agendas to fund/support a war, or not. Insurgents will exploit the political seams via propaganda and other informational/perceptual means to foment internal political dissonance and indecisiveness- the insurgent isolates deployed COIN forces from his people and government. Additionally, western powers have big expensive sticks insurgents know they will not use- this make Rules of Engagement (ROE) an insurgent weapon.
Insurgents will shape the perceptual domain to ensure the indigenous population sees the insurgents as omnipotent and omniscient, and that there will be hell to pay afterwards if the population does not support them in their fight against the counterinsurgent.


Disenfranchised Sunnis initially led the Iraqi resistance in 2003 due to the US uprooting their infrastructure and undermining what order that was preexisting in the country rather than try to preserve infrastructure. Backed into a corner, along with an uncertain future, they began to fight. The lack of cohesiveness of the movement gave way to the insurgent/terrorist organization al Qaida in Iraq who successfully led a campaign of terrorist attacks against the U.S. for roughly three years. Their effectiveness in terms of gaining popular support to fight the US, along with successful media-backed international recruitment efforts, culminated with the perception in 2005 that Iraq was unwinnable to US forces. The perception the US was out to destroy the Sunni, mostly due to the Coalition Provisional Authorities de-Ba’athification effort, gave birth to the Iraqi Sunni resistance- there was no fully functioning constituted Iraqi government at the time. The Sunni were trying to push out an occupation force.


Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists waged campaigns of violence against those cooperating with counterinsurgent forces in Iraq. This prevented the local population from speaking out. AQI penetrated social infrastructure, economic and security mechanisms. Iraqis felt the psychological pressure of being watched from every direction and often preferred to collude with AQI to survive, knowing the counterinsurgent was not likely going to hurt them without cause. Iraqi fears of AQI became amplified when locals realized they were being released from prison due to lack of evidence only to come back and seek vengeance against those who reported them in the first place- Iraqi’s felt working with COIN forces was a futile effort. This gave AQI, at minimum, a tacit support structure to sustain operations.


Mexico 2008-2009. Press reports government of Mexico is failing in its ability to manage the narco-terrorist problem in their country that resulted in the deaths approximately 7000 people for 2008 alone; ~1000 within the first three months of 2009. Although the killings are mainly directed at competing cartel members, cartel members are killing, co-opting and bribing local officials. Cartel members are also targeting family members of competing cartel members to draw out competitors…killing the innocent and widening the death toll. These actions have so undermined the perception of security and stability in many areas of Mexico that locals are afraid of reporting illicit activities for fear of being killed. The impacts of the cartels activities resonated from being a local problem to an international problem and concern. The cartels have more money and better weapons than government agencies. Honest policemen are being threatened to cooperate with the cartels or they/their families will be tortured and killed. United States government officials, and some agencies, see the localized instability is causing a potential strategic problem. Some see Mexico as a failing state because the narco-terrorists are able to conduct operations with impunity. Mexicans do not trust local law enforcement because of perceptions of corruption…social chaos remains. This problem continues to fester. The cartel’s psychological dominance of their battle space allows them to continue operations with little resistance.


Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri survived numerous attacks while able to change the way of life in the U.S. in 2001; a country with over a ¼ billion people at the time. They changed US laws; undermined the US stock market, forced the creation of multiple new agencies- all done by 19 people. Some see al Qaeda as leading a global resistance movement to disrupt US influence. The psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks show what impacts 19 people can have on the world’s last superpower.


Hezbollah’s Stand against Israel from within Lebanon. Hezbollah infiltrated and penetrated Lebanese society so Israel had to attack them by attacking innocent Lebanese. Overt military force served as blowback against the Israelis; bad media; no military gains; became a political failure. The Arab world recognized Israel’s weakness and believes Israel’s image of invincibility no longer exists.


Iran conducts covert activities via Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with impunity in Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, Africa, the Palestinian territories and a number of other locations. Iran is effectively engaging US military forces by proxy.


Proxy wars allow Iran to fight the US without direct attribution, to subvert US objectives without going to full-scale war for which it know it will lose. Proxy wars are economy of force operations both in terms of people and material. Proxy wars have the impact of a good sniper. One good sniper can hold back a company (~100 men) or battalion (~500 men) under the right conditions; two snipers can instill fear in a city of millions, shut down highways and impact the economy and security such as the Washington DC snipers of 2002; proxy wars can have a similar impact but in an unconventional sense. Iran has an image of a nation that cannot be stopped because the international community is unwilling to do anything against it.


Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Iran supports and participates in proxy wars, Iran circumvents US and international sanctions, Iran successfully conducts political and psychological warfare without being punished. Iran understands that power and influence is more related to perception than reality.


To disrupt insurgent psychological dominance; COIN forces should find and exploit opportunities to unravel the insurgents’ ability to be effective as an organization. This first begins by severing/subverting his relationship with society. This creates the necessary foundation for stability and security to follow.


COIN forces can use direct and indirect means to disrupt the insurgents’ psychological dominance over the indigenous population in his area of operation. Direct means may be in the form of large presence patrols or other overt means. Indirect means may involve information operations or the use of proxies; meaning any efforts that are not overt.


Late 2008/early 2009, Israel used both overt and surreptitious means to attack Hamas in the Palestinian territories. In conjunction with surreptitious collaboration (infiltration) with some Palestinians, overt overwhelming military force was used against the populace-embedded Hamas. Media coverage and international condemnations coincided with the Israeli offensive. However, Israel knows the international body (United Nations) and other western nations do not truly hold any real power- if the international body cannot stop terrorists or non-state actors, they really cannot do much against nation-states like Israel. Israel recognized sanctions do not work; North Korea, Iraq and Iran were all under/remain under sanctions, but it never stopped any of them from achieving their goals or pressing forward their agendas. Knowing this, Israel persisted and punched through the enemy media/information operations barrier in a manner metaphorically comparable to the “Wizard of Oz”; of Toto going behind the curtain to reveal the Wizard who was manipulating the perceptions of the world for self-gain. Israel was able to undermine and discredit the effectiveness of Hamas before the world by maintaining their resolve and focus. A number of press reports following the conflict also noted how some locals hated Hamas for their abuse of locals. Israel achieved some success in splitting Hamas from its popular support base, which was often coerced. Note however, that despite this success, Israel’s job is not yet finished if they or the United Nations do not replace the Hamas void with some type of sustainable governance that is good for everyone. If this is ignored, Hamas will simply regenerate, with new lessons learned, and come back to fight another day. In this case, Israel did not lose focus of their mission and intent; neither did Israel dither too much with policies or unproductive sentiment. Israel ignored the inept United Nations and international community by following the Royal Bank of Scotland’s slogan ‘Make it Happen’.


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Thursday, October 27, 2011

One More Thing – Regarding Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Comment:  The following excerpt from Notes of a Counterinsurgent is to finally set the stage for understanding this piece as a whole.  Understand the following:

-The piece is a primer

-Countering subversives is a thinking man’s game. 

-Countering subversives often involves out-maneuvering, not out-killing

-Perceptions are just important as reality; shaping them or understanding how they are shaped is important to know and understand

-Limitations and challenges to countering subversion

One More Thing

Notes of a Counterinsurgent is just that, notes. Each insurgency is different, but certain patterns remain constant. This small guide focuses on such patterns; it is designed to be a primer, or a reference, for the counterinsurgent or counter-subversive. If a reader wants to go in more detail, references will be noted in following postings that address key principles noted in this small guide.

There are a number of guides/books today that address the issue of insurgency, counterinsurgency, subversion and counter-subversion. Some books address enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. Other books address advancements in warfare. The constant, however, is that the best weapon of the insurgent and counterinsurgent has comes free and weighs a few pounds- it’s called a brain.

Decisions and actions are based on perceptions, it is the counterinsurgents job to influence, control, manipulate and embed perceptions favorable to his intent. Failure to do so leaves the insurgent to do this against you…he is weak, but if the counterinsurgent ignores the perception issue he will be defeated regardless.

This guide intends to focus mostly on nonphysical issues pertaining to insurgency and insurgent type environments. When we address insurgency in this guide we are also including terrorism, a subset of insurgency, as well as other environments where ambush, surprise and hiding in society is the primary modus operandi.

This guide will focus on mental and moral aspects of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent. The guide highlights important principles realized over many years that remain applicable today, despite changes in technology.

Ultimate mission success in counterinsurgency requires an interagency approach and involvement of the local population, an approach way beyond the tactical operator or analyst to affect. Therefore, the focus of this book mostly on the military/security aspect of the fight in order to help the tactical operator cause shock in a movement and establish initial momentum/dominance. It’s important to know that if the other interagency and population buy-in pieces take too long to follow suit, gains will be blunted and the battle will be prolonged. You will be in a quagmire.

Policy, laws, rules of engagement will impact your ability to affect actions on the ground. It’s important for the counterinsurgent to recognize this, to report these challenges to senior commanders and politicians so organizational adaptation remains fluid, symbiotic and effective. Failure to adapt equates to losing.

This piece closes off with a small observation regarding “US Vulnerability to Strategic Surprise in the 21st Century”. Despite the title, it is relevant to the Marine, Soldier, SEAL or Ranger on the ground. The counterinsurgent cannot simply worry about being an operator, operations type, intelligence person, politician, logistics person or lawyer…the counterinsurgent must be familiar with all of these spheres, and much more. Thus Situational Awareness trumps what data/insights intelligence or operational reporting may provide you. Perceptions on the ground are more important than reality because reality is shaped by perceptions. What the population believes as reality is more important than what the counterinsurgent knows as fact because the population, via the media, reacts to it.

Developing a Subversion/Counter-subversion Mentality – “The Approach” from Notes of a Counterinsurgent

 

Comment:  The take-away from this piece of Notes of a Counterinsurgent is that the most important tool in assessing and fighting against a seemingly formless, seditious/subversive threat is ones ability to develop an intuitive feel for the environment they are dealing with- in other words, your mind and instincts are your most important tool.  Intuitive feel refers to a combination of knowledge, instinct, the willingness to adapt to an ever-changing environment, and the willingness to act decisively when making a timely decision is more important than making the perfect decision.  Hence, this is exactly why I use the linebacker metaphor below.

Also note that while I used the term insurgency and counterinsurgency frequently, just understand what I’m really talking about is subversion and counter-subversion.  The latter of the two perspectives is less militarily and politically motivated; subversion/counter-subversion applies across the spectrum of threats from state actors, non-state actors, to criminals, etc.

One needs to understand that realization is based upon understanding the nature of the threat, its modus operandi, etc.  For example, pardon the crudeness, if a gent wants to take a lady to bed he’s not likely going to be successful in getting her to bed if he does not first seem to take an interest in her and is willing to wine her and dine her.  Doing this allows him to soften the playing field in order to set the conditions for him to achieve his objective.  He does this indirectly.

The Mexican drug trafficking organizations will be no different when they are not in a strong position to readily take over, or control, a town to meet their objectives.  They may try to first woo the people to their favor so as not to risk alienating what may develop into a friendly/cooperative support base.  This perspective can be applied to other scenarios as well.  Over time however, once the relationship is consummated, then the relationship may change when one is no longer wooed, but dominated and/or controlled.

This may be one reason why the cartel problem that began in Mexico in the 80s was not disrupted then.  Police and government officials were bought and paid for long enough until the cartels then decided to change the conditions of the relationship and their freedom of influence and movement expanded.  Now the cartels dictate how the government runs in some parts of Mexico.  Folks, this is subversion…learn to recognize it…learn how to mitigate it.

Approach

This intent of this piece is to provide the reader immediate patterns to cue on in order to begin taking action…to achieve effects.

Counterinsurgency (COIN), hybrid threat, environments require the mind of a linebacker. It is paramount that linebackers maintain situational awareness, an intuitive feel for their areas of operation. Linebackers cue on anomalies and attempt to engage the threat while it remains subtle. Failure to engage threats while they remain subtle often results in a situation escaping bounds of control/influence, one becomes reactive vice proactive- one becomes susceptible to ambush.

There is no time to review history during the conduct of COIN, you have to act based upon the moment with what’s available. Your enemy will ALWAYS fight you from the shadows; the enemy will never allow a true picture of himself to be revealed [deception]; the enemy will create situations to force you to overreact and exploit your own pattern of mistakes to undermine your efforts. This allows insurgents to leverage your energy against yourself by allowing you to isolate yourself from the population. The counterinsurgent is fighting a system, not individual parts. Counterinsurgents must find the seams that weave these parts together and rip them wide open, by proxy when possible, in order to undermine the social fabric that supports the insurgent/terrorist by force or subtle approaches. From there theSoteBWsmall counterinsurgent can go on the offensive. The intent of this small, direct, guide is to get the reader thinking and operating in this direction.

 

Also read:  Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Notes of a Counterinsurgent and Mexico

For those reading this blog, I’ve decided to post portions of a reader I completed a few years ago addressing the issue of insurgency and counterinsurgency in a piece call “Notes of a Counterinsurgent”.  Most of the information is applicable to counter-gang, counterintelligence, and other forms of low-intensity conflict…conflicts involves stealth, infiltration, subversion- shadow-wars.  Note that the postings from this piece are from a generalist perspective, meaning one needs to determine if the observation applies to the situation at hand, or if the situation is altogether different.  The piece is intended to provide readers a broad fundamental understanding regarding the nature of what I still call Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), despite all the myriad acronyms that have replaced it today- Irregular Warfare (IW) or Asymmetric Warfare (AW) being two of them. The Wiki definition of LIC suffices for the purposes pertaining to the issues discussed.  Despite my preference for the use of LIC.  LIC is anything but low-intensity.  LIC is low-intensity from the perspective of large ground forces, formations and movements.  LIC, however, is much more violent and personal.

ALL conflicts are different.  There’s no panacea to mitigation and/or disruption, but there are what appears to be some general principles.  That said, use the following-on postings with a title reference of “Notes of a Counterinsurgent” as an observation for reflection/consideration.

I wrote the piece in 2009, but took it off publication because an entity wanted to use it for their training curriculum.  However, I did not want to make certain suggested changes to the piece because I felt it would water-down the meaning of what I’m trying to convey.

That said, Notes of a Counterinsurgent addresses the following-

This book will be of utility to those dealing with the following issues:

-Infiltration

-Subversion

-Gangs

-Organized Crime

-Insurgency

-Counterinsurgency

-Psychological Warfare

-Indirect Approaches, what many today call ‘asymmetric warfare’

Here is a modified introduction…note that some of the references, such as al Qaida in Iraq, may be somewhat dated- but very relevant to this discussion.

Introduction

This piece is an amalgam of mentorship, self-study and observation. My primary mentors are my family and faith. My parents taught me to work and study hard. It was the nuns of my Catholic faith who first taught me to recognize and understand the significance and essence of soft approaches, as well as the exploitable gaps of the human spirit and mind- I never realized how applicable those insights would be years later. However, I owe everything to my wife for allowing me to travel the world apart from her, study and meet new people, which led me to the concepts laid before you.

I learned soft approaches in the form of deception, infiltration and subversion- through the likes of “The Angel of Light”, and the “Serpent in the Garden of Eden”, while growing up in Catholic school. Mankind was damned to eternal suffering after being deceived to eat forbidden fruit by Satan.

Insurgents use the same modus operandi as Satan. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is a modern day example of the devil as Iraqis were deceived into biting the forbidden fruit of extremist insurgency, criminality and terrorism only for the al Qaeda Devil to come back to steal their souls by killing their families and destroying their way of life. Mexico is dealing with her Devil today in the form of drug cartels that offer money/riches in exchange for family, life and freedom. Hezbollah of Lebanon purchased Lebanese souls under the guise of humanitarian organizations to wage war with Israel in 2006 by hiding within the civilian populace as Israel conducted bombing raids to protect itself from terrorist attacks; as did Hamas in the Palestinian territories (2008/2009) by threatening death against other Palestinians if they did not actively support their violent terrorist actions against Israel.

Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, Napoleon and Osama bin Laden were/are charismatic leaders/influencers of the mind and soul. They brought the world to major wars, death and destruction- they were/are all social vampires.

The observations in these pieces ARE NOT NEW; they’ve been with us since the days of Sun Tzu, thousands of years ago. However, we often do not train our military personnel to think and operate well in these environments. Many of us learn this kind of thinking through the “school of hard knocks” and/or personal study/reflection.

The modernized insights conveyed in this book were gained during the conduct, planning and study of various military operations over the last 20 years. And although this book has the word counterinsurgency as part of its title, do not be fooled. The methods the reader will find this book remains valid in almost every environment where governmental and social instability exists such as your Haiti, Liberia, Algeria, Balkans, Asia, Latin America or the Middle East. The same environments our military tactical leaders from private to captain will be fighting.

Deception, infiltration, positioning and subversion enable enemies of the U.S. to exploit society and achieve strategic surprise e.g. 9/11, Tanzania bombings, conduct assassinations e.g. Yitzchak Rabin or Benazir Bhutto. Modern man believes it is the physical act that kills or destroys man- this is false. The act of killing, destroying or subverting begins by deception and infiltration – in all begins in the mind. Once properly positioned, and the conditions are right, the physical act of termination is simply the final stage.

If one fails to look for the subtleties of deception and infiltration, one will be caught surprised like buried termites of an untreated house as things look great on the surface, yet rotted from the inside, made weak and led to implosion. This book will help teach you want to look for, where to concentrate your resources, and where to begin targeting the threat.

I also want to thank my mentor, Marine Corps Colonel Gary I. Wilson, who introduced me to the controversial concept of 4th Generation Warfare and the concepts of the late Colonel John Boyd of OODA Loop fame [his concepts also influences my thinking to this day]. The name 4th Generation Warfare remains an issue of contention but the modus operandi of the enemy and SoteBWsmallthe inability of nation states to effectively disrupt such threats are clear. Colonel Wilson’s influence and guidance created an energy that drives me to this day.

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Shadowy group says it targets Mexico drug cartel; some are glad - Los Angeles Times

 

Comment: While it is understandable people should be concerned about vigilante killings, what is the alternative when the government of Mexico and its police forces are corrupt or inept? Vigilante groups can serve as a temporary stabilizer and/or change agent until something more functional can operate in the open without being targeted. In the meantime however, it is wise for Mexicans to fights from the shadows until they can stabilize their local areas enough to where it is safe for police forces to resurface without being targeted for killing and/or bribes.

No, the vigilante effort is not perfect, it’s a band aid. Had Mexico addressed the worsening plight of the people starting in the early days of the drug war in the 80s, we might not be looking at such a situation.

So, regarding who is behind the killings?  That’s not important right now as the people’s security must come first, but the people of Mexico must develop an understanding of their protectors so they do not go into thermal runaway. 

One cannot blame Mexicans for going this route, they are like any other human being, they are addicted to living and protecting their families.  To be successful, the Mexicans need to disrupt the psychological grip the cartels have over the people by fighting back.  The article below shows how they are doing this.

The only effective forces in Mexico at this time are the Mexicans willing to fight back, and the military.  The government…so so.

Excerpts:

Shadowy group says it targets cartel; some in Veracruz are glad

 

MEXICO UNDER SIEGE

 

It is a sign of the desperation and outrage over drug-war violence that the vigilantes are not only tolerated but welcomed. But there is a disturbing question: Just who is behind their killings?

Suspected members of the Zetas drug gang are escorted this month for public presentation at a naval aircraft hangar in Mexico City. They were arrested by the Mexican military in Veracruz state, as were members of the co-called Zeta killers, part of a shadowy anti-cartel paramilitary group there.

Suspected members of the Zetas drug gang are escorted this month for public… (Bernardo Montoya / Reuters)

October 19, 2011|By Tracy Wilkinson, Los Angeles Times

Reporting from Veracruz, Mexico — The callers to the radio program were voicing their support for the Matazetas, the Zeta killers.

Better they fight among themselves. Let them kill each other. Anything to rid us of the thugs who long ago took control of our city and are slaughtering our people.

It is a sign of the desperation and deep outrage over surging drug-war violence that a shadowy group of vigilante killers is not only tolerated but welcomed by many here in Mexico's third-most populous state.

In videotaped presentations, a group of masked men with military bearing has claimed responsibility for the spate of killings, portraying it as a cleansing operation. Many of the bodies had a "Z" for Zeta written on the back with ink marker, a witness said.

The mystery group announced that it was in Veracruz state as "the armed branch of the people, and for the people."

"We are asking officials and authorities who support the Zetas to stop doing so, and let the armed forces know that our only objective is to finish the Zetas," the spokesman for the group told the camera. "We are anonymous warriors, without faces, proudly Mexican."

Their sudden rise and the surgical precision with which the killers systematically picked off nearly 100 people in 17 days has led to conjecture among some people that they may be operating with implicit or direct support of the government or military. Some suggest that the June kidnapping, torture and killing of three marine cadets in Veracruz might have propelled the marine corps to begin acting outside the law. Officials dismiss such speculation, and others wonder why a group aspiring to be a clandestine death squad would post videos on YouTube.

In the Michoacan case, the federal government tried, and failed, to prosecute several officials for their ties to La Familia. And Fernandez, a member of Calderon's political faction, was eventually reined in, or at least quieted, by party elders.

 

Read full piece here:  Shadowy group says it targets Mexico drug cartel; some are glad - Los Angeles Times

Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State

Mexico Fears Rise of Vigilante Justice - WSJ.com

Comment:  While there is no doubt that vigilante justice is undesired, one must consider the fact the Mexican government is unable to govern and meet the security needs of its people.  Security is more perception than reality, and if local Mexicans feel more secure and empowered to proactively protect themselves against rogue threats that Mexico’s government officials cannot…oh well.

Vigilante groups were successful in turning the al Qaeda in Iraq threat, thus giving the US a way out.  If it were not for the Iraqi vigilante groups, its likely we would all be looking at a different kind of Iraq today.  Vigilante groups can give some hope and stability to people badly needing it, thus slowing down the downward spiral into further chaos.

Excerpt:

Jorge Chabat, a security analyst at the CIDE think tank in Mexico says that the emergence of illegal groups such as the Mata Zetas—perhaps with some help from local or national government authorities—wouldn't be a surprise, given the level of violence inflicted by the Zetas on the Mexican population and the Mexican state's inability to provide its citizens with protection.

Officials "would never tell you openly, but I wouldn't be surprised if some sectors of government look the other way, and I fear that parts of the civilian population would also see this with approval," he said.

Read full article here:  Mexico Fears Rise of Vigilante Justice - WSJ.com

U.S. Infiltrating Criminal Groups Across Mexico - NYTimes.com

 

Excerpt:

Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert on organized crime at the Brookings Institution, said that while some had criticized the D.E.A. for entertaining “deals with the devil,” she saw the Zambada case as an important intelligence coup. Even in an age of high-tech surveillance, she said, there is no substitute for human sources’ feeding authorities everything from what targeted traffickers like to eat to where they sleep most nights.

A former senior counternarcotics official echoed that thought.

“A D.E.A. agent’s job, first and foremost, is to get inside the body of those criminal organizations he or she is investigating,” the former official said, asking not to be identified because he occasionally does consulting work in Mexico. “Nothing provides that microscopic view more than a host that opens the door.”

Read the full piece here:  U.S. Infiltrating Criminal Groups Across Mexico - NYTimes.com

Saturday, October 22, 2011

Resource: 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment – ...

There is some overlap with what's occurring in Mexico and what's occurring in the US. The economy, desire to make money, broken families, failed governance and laws are seeds to further instability within the US as well as Mexico.

The American Backyard.NET: Resource: 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment – ...: Below is an excerpt the summarizes the report. I recommend downloading the full document to gain a full appreciation of the issues discusse...

Monday, October 3, 2011

Free Resource: Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security

 

Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security

Authored by Dr. Paul Rexton Kan.

Mexico's

  • Added October 03, 2011
  • Type: Monograph
  • 50 Pages
  • Download Format: PDF
  • Cost: Free

 

Brief Synopsis

Since 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or are failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from "narco-refugees." Given the ever increasing cruelty of the cartels, the question is whether and how the U.S. Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a flood gate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To successfully navigate through this complex issue will require a greater level of understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government.

Source:  Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security