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Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations
Jan 18, 2012 Author: Peter Chalk
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico have emerged with alarming speed during the last several years, plunging the country’s northern border states into a virtual war zone as they compete for lucrative smuggling routes into the United States.[1] Although Mexican President Felipe Calderon has moved to decisively dislodge the cartels’ power base since taking office in 2006, several prominent organizations continue to exist, benefiting from pervasive corruption that has extended to the highest echelons of Mexico’s law enforcement bureaucracy.
While DTOs have obvious ramifications for Mexican stability, their activities have also directly impinged on U.S. security, with high-level criminality north of the border frequently “migrating” south. This has been particularly evident in Arizona, which currently has among the highest rates of drug-related kidnappings in the United States. Another state experiencing difficulties is Texas, where merchants and wealthy families in frontier towns periodically face extortion threats and which occasionally witnesses narco-murders.[2] On a wider level, syndicates have directly contributed to a growing problem of inner-city gang violence; Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Dallas and San Francisco are all cases in point.[3] DTOs have also become actively involved in the American people smuggling “business.” It is now a common practice for cartels to assist migrants looking to enter the United States illegally on condition that they carry cocaine packs with them.[4] Finally, there is some concern about a possible nexus emerging between the Mexican drug trade and terrorism. According to U.S. officials, Lebanese Hizb Allah has already secured a highly lucrative source of financing by helping to launder cocaine profits for groups such as the Los Zetas through a range of Shi`a-owned businesses in West Africa.[5]
This article provides brief background information on the seven DTOs that remain at the forefront of the cocaine trade in Mexico: the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, La Familia, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran Leyva Organization, the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel), and the Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel).
The Gulf Cartel
The Gulf Cartel is based out of Matamoros in Tamaulipas State, just across the border from Brownsville, Texas. The group’s origins date back to bootlegging in the 1970s, with the move to cocaine trafficking occurring during the 1980s and 1990s. For many years, the Gulf Cartel was considered the most powerful of the Mexican DTOs, enforcing its control through a highly feared paramilitary arm known as the Los Zetas. Since 2007, however, the prominence of the group has begun to wither, both as a result of the elimination of much of its leadership—including the syndicate’s longtime godfather, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, and his brother, Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen[6]—and due to the defection of the Los Zetas in 2009, which now act as an independent organization. The group’s current leader is Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez (“El Coss”) who is desperately trying to prevent the Zetas from making in-roads into its northern Tamaulipas trafficking corridor, which runs between Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo on the Texan border.[7] As part of this effort, the Gulf Cartel has developed and deployed “narco-tanks”—trucks fitted with air conditioning and steel plates that can only be breached with anti-tank grenades—to patrol its smuggling routes. Four of these vehicles were seized from a garage in Camargo in June 2011.[8]
Los Zetas
The Los Zetas were founded by former members of the Grupos Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), an elite special forces unit that deserted from the Mexican military between 1996 and 2000.[9] It acted as the paramilitary arm of the Gulf Cartel, but in 2009 it emerged as an increasingly significant DTO in its own right. The organization is currently competing with the Gulf Cartel for control over trafficking routes in Tamaulipas State, although it has also expanded its presence to Zacatecas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campache, the capital territory, Quintana Roo and Chiapas. The group has also worked with the Beltran Leyva Organization in an effort to extend influence into Cuidad Juarez—the locus of one of the main trafficking routes into the United States. Although the Los Zetas have been described as one of the most violent DTOs in Mexico, its ability to consolidate control over the country’s northern border provinces has been curtailed by the arrest of several top commanders since 2008. Prominent in this regard are Mateo Lopez (“Comandante Mateo”), Efrain Teodoro Torres (“Z-14”), Daniel Perez (“El Cachetes”), Manuel Perez Izquierdo (“El Siete Latas”), Marco Garza de Leon Quiroga (“El Chabelo”) and Jaime Gonzalez Duran (“El Hummer”). The first five were all high-ranking members in the group’s overall leadership structure, while the sixth was responsible for coordinating and overseeing cocaine imports from Central America.[10] One of the group’s founders and long-term leaders, Heriberto Lazcano (“El Lazca”), remains at large, along with his number two, Trevino Morales (“Z-40”).[11]
La Familia
La Familia emerged as an independent group in 2006 with the purported dual aim of “defending citizens, merchants, businesses and farmers” from all forms of crime, and filling the security void left by the central government. Its founder, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez (“El Mas Loco,” or the “Craziest One”), required all members to carry a “spiritual manual” that contained references to pseudo-Christian aphorisms for self-improvement, which gave the organization overtones as a religious cult. Since its creation, however, La Familia has systematically morphed into a DTO, becoming especially notorious for what it refers to as “social work”—the ruthless execution (usually by beheading) of those who do not conform to the parameters of its self-defined “law enforcement” code. The group has a confirmed presence in 77 cities across the state of Michoacan (its main base), Queretaro, Guanajuanto, Jalisco, Colima, Aguascalientes and Guerro, as well as the Federal district.[12] Despite this wide geographic “footprint,” La Familia has suffered considerably from both leadership decapitations and desertions. In December 2010, its founder Gonzalez was killed during a shoot-out with security forces; this setback was followed six months later when his successor, Jose de Jesus Mendez Vargas (“El Chango,” or “The Monkey”), was captured in the city of Aguascalientes, roughly 265 miles southeast of Mexico City. Compounding the group’s problems has been internal hemorrhaging, with growing numbers of members leaving to join a splinter group known as Caballeros Templarios (Knight’s Templar). Enrique Plancarte Solis and Servando Gomez Martinez established the latter entity in March 2011 as an alternative vehicle for achieving “public justice,” and the group now poses a serious challenge to La Familia’s continued organizational cohesion, if not existence.[13]
The Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa Cartel was established as La Alizana de Sangre in the mid-1990s. After its founder, Hector Luis Palma Salazar (“El Guero”), was arrested in 1995, Joaquin Guzman (“El Chapo,” or “Shorty”) took control and remains the current leader. He is the most wanted drug lord in Mexico and is thought to have a personal fortune of $1 billion.[14] The Sinaloa Cartel controls most of the state by the same name and retains important bases in Baja California, Durango (where Guzman is believed to be hiding), Sonora, Jalisco and Chihuahua. The group is known to have established distribution cells across the United States, sending cocaine shipments via tunnels dug below the southern U.S. border. It is also thought to have set up additional Andean hubs to facilitate the transshipment of Peruvian and Colombian cocaine through West Africa to Europe. Although the Sinaloa Cartel has witnessed the arrests of high-ranking members, including the infamous Teodoro Garcia Simental (“El Teo,” who was behind much of the drug-related violence that plagued the border provinces in 2008 and 2009)[15] and Ovidio Limon Sanchez (who managed Sinaloan cocaine movements bound for the American market), it remains the most powerful and influential DTO in Mexico.[16] The group has been battling for control of two key trafficking routes that respectively abut New Mexico and California, each of which it is now thought to largely dominate: one in Cuidad Juarez, where it has been competing with the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate, Beltran Leyva Organization—both former allies—and the Los Zetas; and one in Tijuana, which is also contested by the Arellano Felix Organization.[17]
The Beltran Leyva Organization
The Beltran Leyva Organization was largely the product of four brothers who were born in the state of Sinaloa in the 1960s: Marcus Arturo (“El Barbas”), Carlos (“El jefe de jefes”), Alfredo (“El Mochomo”) and Hector (“El Ingeniero”). The quartet was originally closely allied with the Sinaloa Cartel, but broke with the group in 2008 after Alfredo was arrested following an alleged Sinaloan betrayal. Initially, the organization proved capable of resisting competition from its parent syndicate as well as infiltrating counternarcotic units and assassinating some of their most senior officers.[18] The Beltrans’ influence, however, has diminished due to the loss of some of its most prominent members. The first major setback occurred in December 2009 when its leader at the time, Arturo, was killed. This was followed by a string of apprehensions in 2010 that netted Carlos Beltran in January, Gerardo Alvarez-Vasquez (“El Indio”) in April, Edgar Valdez Villarreal (“La Barbie”) in August and Sergio Villarreal Barragan (“El Grande”) in September. Another senior lieutenant, Oscar Osvaldo Garcia Montoya (“El Compayito”), was detained in April 2011.[19] His capture has been described as eliminating the “last Beltran-Leyva link of any importance.”[20] This would appear to be an overstatement. The group has forged alliances of convenience with the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate and the Los Zetas and continues to engage the Sinaloans for control of territory in Cuidad Juarez.[21] It also retains at least a residual leadership structure that is overseen by Hector, one of the original founding brothers.
Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel)
The Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate is based in the northern city of Cuidad Juarez in Chihuahua State, just across the border from El Paso, Texas. The organization is led by Vincente Carrillo Fuentes (“El Viceroy”),[22] has a standing alliance with the Beltran Leyva Organization and is similarly fighting the Sinaloans for control of Juarez. It maintains a highly brutal enforcement wing known as La Linea that is composed of corrupt police officers. The unit’s long-time commander, Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez (“El Diego”), was captured in August 2011. He has admitted to personally ordering 1,500 killings and is also thought to be the mastermind behind the 2010 killings of a U.S. Consulate employee, her husband and another worker at the U.S. mission in Cuidad Juarez.[23] At its height, the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate was assumed to be responsible for about half of all the illegal drugs that pass through Mexico to the United States by using a street gang, Barrio Azteca, to coordinate sales, distribution and, when necessary, contract killings in cities such as Austin, Dallas and El Paso.[24] According to some American sources, these activities earned the organization as much as $200 million per week.[25] Although the syndicate’s control over trafficking routes through Chihuahua has been significantly dented by Sinaloan competition, it continues to be an important player in the overall Mexican drug scene. The group’s members also retain a reputation for extreme violence; for example, they were implicated in the infamous Cuidad Juarez serial-murder site that was first reported in 2004 and which has since been dubbed the “House of Death.”[26]
Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel)
The Arellano Felix Organization, which operates primarily in the state of Baja California but also has an important presence in Zacatecas and Sinaloa, was at one time one of the largest and most violent DTOs in Mexico. It was initially organized around five brothers and four sisters who inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo after he was arrested in 1989 for complicity in the murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official.[27] Four of the main siblings as well as other senior lieutenants have since been arrested or killed, including Benjamin Arellano Felix (the cartel’s principal drug lord), Eduardo Arellano Felix, Ramon Eduardo Arellano Felix, Francisco Javier Arellano Felix, Francisco Sillas Rocha and Armado Villareal Heredia.[28] These losses have dramatically curtailed the organization’s penetration and reach, with competitors such as the Sinaloans increasingly muscling into its home turf and taking control over some of its key smuggling routes.[29] That said, the cartel continues to operate in Baja California, retains a presence, albeit a declining one, in 15 other states and still controls important street-level trafficking cells in the United States. The current leader is thought to be Luis Fernando Sanchez, the nephew of Enedina Arellano Felix (one of the sisters who originally inherited the cartel from Gallardo).[30] He reportedly works closely with Edgardo Leyva Escandon, a trained sniper who has been tied to the assassinations of several drug kingpins and who is also wanted on weapons and ammunition smuggling charges. The United States has posted rewards of $2 million apiece for information leading to the arrests or convictions of the two men.[31]
Conclusion
These seven organizations can essentially be split into two main competing blocs: the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel and La Familia, which formed a cooperative union known as the New Federation in February 2010; and a loose pattern of shifting coalitions among the remaining four syndicates. This alliance structure appears to have some longevity built into it, given bonds of beneficial business relationships and, just as importantly, vendettas and unpaid blood debts.
Given ongoing demand for cocaine in North America and Western Europe, pervasive corruption in Mexico and the enormous profits that can be made from the illegal drug trade, the problems associated with DTO competition and violence south of the U.S. border are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. While alliances may fluctuate—and despite the loss of several prominent narco “kingpins”—there is no indication that any of the seven organizations are about to collapse, disband or voluntarily cease their activity. This has serious implications for the United States, which remains the world’s number one consumer of Andean-sourced narcotics.
Thus far, the United States has tended to emphasize supply interdiction in its overall counternarcotics efforts. This policy has clearly not worked, which is reflected by the endemic instability that now besets Mexico—the corridor for roughly 95% of the cocaine flowing out of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. In looking to the future, it is evident that the United States will need to develop a more balanced approach that both bolsters support to the Calderon government while simultaneously addressing the demand-side—that is, the American side—of the drug equation.
Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst with the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. He has worked on a range of projects examining transnational security threats in Latin America, Africa and Asia. He is Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism—one of the foremost journals in the international security field—and serves as an Adjunct Professor with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
[1] An estimated 47,515 people have died in Mexico drug-related violence since 2006. See “Mexico Drug War Deaths over Five Years Now Total 47,515,” BBC, January 12, 2012.
[2] Brian Ross, Richard Esposito and Asa Eslocker, “Kidnapping Capital of USA,” ABC News, February 11, 2009; Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “The Long Arm of the Lawless,” Stratfor, February 25, 2009; Randal Archibold, “Wave of Drug Violence Creeping into Arizona from Mexico, Officials Say,” New York Times, February 23, 2009; David Danelo, “Space Invaders: Mexican Illegal Aliens and the US,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 29, 2008.
[3] The Carrillo Fuentes group frequently uses Barrio Azteca to carry out contract killings in Texas and New Mexico. Another organization generating concern is the Mexican La Eme, which has expanded into the barrios of eastern Los Angeles where it works as a freelance debt collector and enforcer for cartels seeking to extend local market control. See, for instance, Jay Albanese, “Prison Break: Mexican Gang Moves Operations Outside US Jails,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 4, 2008; Adam Elkus, “Gangs, Terrorists and Trade,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 17, 2007; John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “State of Siege: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 2008; Clare Ribando, Gangs in Central America (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005).
[4] Tim Padgett, “People Smugglers Inc.,” Time Magazine, August 12, 2003; Heather MacDonald, “The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave,” City Journal, Winter 2004; Jameson Taylor, “Illegal Immigration: Drugs, Gangs and Crime,” Civitas Institute, November 2007; “National Drug Threat Assessment 2010,” National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, February 2010.
[5] Jo Becker, “Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing,” New York Times, December 13, 2011. Gunmen from Los Zetas were also alleged to have been involved in Iran’s purported recent plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. If true, it is not unreasonable to assume that Hizb Allah acted as the go-between for the plan given its close relations with Tehran and suspected ties to the Mexican syndicate. For more on the supposed plot, see Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of Plot to Kill Saudi’s U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011.
[6] Cardenas was arrested in 2003 but continued to run the Gulf Cartel from prison. He was extradited to the United States in January 2007.
[7] Fred Burton and Stephen Meiners, “Mexico and the War Against the Drug Cartels in 2008,” Stratfor, December 9, 2008; Sylvia Longmire, “Mexico’s Drug War: TCO 101: The Gulf Cartel,” www.borderviolenceanalysis.typepad.com, accessed December 12, 2011; George Grayson, “Mexico and the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2007; Jo Tuckman, “Body Count Mounts as Drug Cartels Battle Each Other – and the Police,” Guardian, May 27, 2008; “5630 Execution Murders in 2008: Mexican Drug Cartels,” Right Side News, January 1, 2009.
[8] “Mexican Army Destroys Drug Cartel ‘Narco-Subs,’” BBC News, June 6, 2011.
[9] According to Mexican authorities, as many as 1,000 members of GAFE have defected from the army since the late 1990s. Those critical to the formation of Los Zetas included Arturo Guzman Decena (“Z-1,” now dead), Maximino Ortiz, Víctor Hernandez Barron, Augustin Hernandez Martinez, Juan Carlos Tovar, Pedro Cervantes Marquez, Ramiro Rangel and Samuel Flores (all arrested).
[10] George Grayson, “Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2008; Oscar Becerra, “A to Z of Crime: Mexico’s Zetas Expand Operations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 27, 2009; Burton and Meiners; Sullivan and Elkus; Tuckman; “Mexican Police Capture Regional Leader of Violent Drug Cartel,” Latin American Herald Tribune, June 6, 2011; “‘Zetas Drug-Cartel Boss’ Captured in Mexico,” al-Jazira, October 17, 2011.
[11] “Mexico Security Memo: A Zetas Challenge to the Mexican Government,” Stratfor, December 8, 2011.
[12] Oscar Becerra, “Family Business: La Familia: Mexico’s Most Violent Criminals,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 7, 2009; George Grayson, “La Familia: Another Deadly Mexican Syndicate,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2009.
[13] Randal Archibold, “Mexican Police Arrest Leader of Crime Gang,” New York Times, June 22, 2011; Randal Archibold, “Politics Enables Mexican Fugitive To Defang Law,” New York Times, December 15, 2010; “Falling Kingpins, Rising Violence,” Economist, December 18, 2010; “A Leader of Mexico’s Caballeros Templarios Arrested,” Borderland Beat, November 10, 2011; “Mexico Police Raid ‘La Familia Drug Cartel,’ Killing 11,” BBC News, May 28, 2001.
[14] In 2009, Forbes included Guzman on its list of the world’s richest men (701 out of 739).
[15] Simental’s trademark was to boil rivals and enemies in barrels of lye–a practice that became known as pozole after the name for Mexican stew.
[16] The U.S. intelligence community has gone further, describing the cartel as the “most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world.”
[17] Burton and Meiners; Tuckman; Richard Marosi and Ken Ellingwood, “Mexican Drug Lord Teodoro Garcia Simental, Known for his Savagery, is Captured,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2010; Marc Lacey, “Top Mexican Drug Suspect Arrested,” International Herald Tribune, January 14, 2011; “Mexico Arrests High-Ranking Sinaloa Cartel Operator,” Latin American Herald Tribune, November 14, 2011; “US Intelligence Says Sinaloa Cartel Has Won the Battle for Cuidad Juarez Drug Routes,” CNS.com, April 9, 2010.
[18] One of the most senior members killed by the Beltrans was Edgar Millan Gomez–the Federal Police director. He was assassinated in May 2008.
[19] “Mexico Captures Brother of Slain Cartel Boss,” New York Times, January 3, 2010; “Alleged Top Drug Trafficker Caught Near Mexico City,” USA Today, April 22, 2010; Randall Archibold, “Mexican Police Arrest Man Believed to Be Drug Kingpin,” New York Times, August 31, 2010; “Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Kingpin,” BBC News, September 12, 2011; “Falling Kingpins, Rising Violence”; “Mexico Arrests Trafficker Accused of 900 Murders,” Daily Telegraph, August 12, 2011.
[20] Angelo Velasco, “Cae el líder de La Mano con Ojas; lo vinculan con 600 homicidos,” Excelsior, August 12, 2011.
[21] See, for instance, Samuel Logan, “Beltran Leyvas Down But Not Out,” ISN Security Watch, January 8, 2010.
[22] The United States has posted a $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Vincente Carrillo Fuentes.
[23] “Mexican Drug Cartel Enforcer Who ‘Ordered’ 1500 Killings is Captured After US Tip Off,” Mail Online, August 1, 2011.
[24] “Barrio Azteca Gang Behind Juarez Drug Violence,” Drug Crime, April 12, 2010; Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, “Drug Slayings in Mexico Rock U.S. Consulate,” New York Times, March 14, 2010; Marc Lacey, “Raids Aim to Find Killers of 3 in Mexico,” New York Times, March 18, 2010.
[25] Howard La Franchi, “A Look Inside a Giant Drug Cartel,” Christian Science Monitor, December 6, 1999.
[26] David Rose, “House of Death,” Observer, December 3, 2006; Alfredo Corchado, “‘Drug Wars’ Long Shadow,” Dallas Morning News, December 13, 2008; Radley Balko, “The House of Death,” Reason, September 30, 2008.
[27] Tim Steller, “Mexican Drug Runners May Have Used C-130 from Arizona,” Arizona Daily Star, April 15, 1998.
[28] The fifth Felix brother, Francisco Rafeel, was arrested in 1993 and after serving a 10-year sentence was extradited to the United States; he was released from prison in El Paso on February 2, 2008 and returned to Cuidad Juarez. There are two other brothers, Carlos Alberto and Luis Fernando, neither of whom are wanted by the authorities.
[29] See, for instance, Elizabeth Diaz, “Analysis: Mexico’s Tijuana Cartel Weaker as Ex-Boss Comes Home,” Reuters, March 14, 2008; Tuckman; “Mexican Drug Lord Is Arrested,” Reuters, October 26, 2008; “Mexico Seizes Top Drug Suspect,” BBC News, October 27, 2008.
[30] “New Arellano Félix Cartel Leaders,” Justice In Mexico Project, December 4, 2010; “Mexico Seizes Top Drug Suspect.” Enedina is also suspected of playing a role in the cartel’s current activities and as a businesswoman has allegedly facilitated its money laundering operations.
[31] “Edgardo Leyva Escandon,” NarcoticNews.com, accessed December 13, 2011; Anna Cearley, “DEA Man Seeking Man Linked to Arellano Boat,” San Diego Tribune, September 6, 2006.
Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers
Published October 31, 2011
Mexico City - Soldiers seized communications equipment being used by drug traffickers in Reynosa, a border city in the northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas, the army said.
The telecommunications gear was seized on Oct. 11 and Oct. 25 by army patrols, the 4th Military Region command said, without identifying the criminal organization operating the network.
A total of 21 antennas, 22 repeaters, 18 duplexers, eight filters and three transceivers were seized.
The telecom network was dismantled as part of the government's "Operation Northeast" targeting drug traffickers and other organized crime groups, the army said.
Marines dismantled an encrypted communications network last month being used by the Los Zetas drug cartel in 10 cities in the Gulf state of Veracruz.
The network employed 12 antennas, computers, radio transmitters, scanners, thousands of feet of cable, cell phones, decoders and solar panels.
The Gulf cartel and Los Zetas have been waging a brutal turf war in Tamaulipas that has left hundreds of people dead since last year.
The two drug trafficking organizations are trying to gain control of smuggling routes into the United States.
...
A total of 15,270 people died in drug-related violence in Mexico last year, and more than 40,000 people have died since President Felipe Calderon declared war on the country's cartels shortly after taking office in December 2006.
Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment
“In war the moral is to the material three to one”
-Napoleon
Whoever dominates the psychological terrain controls the fight. Counterinsurgent (COIN) forces want to dominate this terrain-it influences the population to choose a side - the insurgent or counterinsurgent.
Winning and security is based more on perception vice reality. Enemies of western powers understand national power is really more of an image in that the full might of military power is restricted from being fully implemented due to internal and international pressures-this gives insurgents the will to prevail.
From a “SO WHAT” perspective, enemies of western powers understand they can win by draining resolve to continue the fight. Western powers have large, obese and lethargic bureaucratic processes that render them quite useless- this makes time an insurgent weapon. Western powers have internal competing agendas to fund/support a war, or not. Insurgents will exploit the political seams via propaganda and other informational/perceptual means to foment internal political dissonance and indecisiveness- the insurgent isolates deployed COIN forces from his people and government. Additionally, western powers have big expensive sticks insurgents know they will not use- this make Rules of Engagement (ROE) an insurgent weapon.
Insurgents will shape the perceptual domain to ensure the indigenous population sees the insurgents as omnipotent and omniscient, and that there will be hell to pay afterwards if the population does not support them in their fight against the counterinsurgent.
Disenfranchised Sunnis initially led the Iraqi resistance in 2003 due to the US uprooting their infrastructure and undermining what order that was preexisting in the country rather than try to preserve infrastructure. Backed into a corner, along with an uncertain future, they began to fight. The lack of cohesiveness of the movement gave way to the insurgent/terrorist organization al Qaida in Iraq who successfully led a campaign of terrorist attacks against the U.S. for roughly three years. Their effectiveness in terms of gaining popular support to fight the US, along with successful media-backed international recruitment efforts, culminated with the perception in 2005 that Iraq was unwinnable to US forces. The perception the US was out to destroy the Sunni, mostly due to the Coalition Provisional Authorities de-Ba’athification effort, gave birth to the Iraqi Sunni resistance- there was no fully functioning constituted Iraqi government at the time. The Sunni were trying to push out an occupation force.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists waged campaigns of violence against those cooperating with counterinsurgent forces in Iraq. This prevented the local population from speaking out. AQI penetrated social infrastructure, economic and security mechanisms. Iraqis felt the psychological pressure of being watched from every direction and often preferred to collude with AQI to survive, knowing the counterinsurgent was not likely going to hurt them without cause. Iraqi fears of AQI became amplified when locals realized they were being released from prison due to lack of evidence only to come back and seek vengeance against those who reported them in the first place- Iraqi’s felt working with COIN forces was a futile effort. This gave AQI, at minimum, a tacit support structure to sustain operations.
Mexico 2008-2009. Press reports government of Mexico is failing in its ability to manage the narco-terrorist problem in their country that resulted in the deaths approximately 7000 people for 2008 alone; ~1000 within the first three months of 2009. Although the killings are mainly directed at competing cartel members, cartel members are killing, co-opting and bribing local officials. Cartel members are also targeting family members of competing cartel members to draw out competitors…killing the innocent and widening the death toll. These actions have so undermined the perception of security and stability in many areas of Mexico that locals are afraid of reporting illicit activities for fear of being killed. The impacts of the cartels activities resonated from being a local problem to an international problem and concern. The cartels have more money and better weapons than government agencies. Honest policemen are being threatened to cooperate with the cartels or they/their families will be tortured and killed. United States government officials, and some agencies, see the localized instability is causing a potential strategic problem. Some see Mexico as a failing state because the narco-terrorists are able to conduct operations with impunity. Mexicans do not trust local law enforcement because of perceptions of corruption…social chaos remains. This problem continues to fester. The cartel’s psychological dominance of their battle space allows them to continue operations with little resistance.
Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri survived numerous attacks while able to change the way of life in the U.S. in 2001; a country with over a ¼ billion people at the time. They changed US laws; undermined the US stock market, forced the creation of multiple new agencies- all done by 19 people. Some see al Qaeda as leading a global resistance movement to disrupt US influence. The psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks show what impacts 19 people can have on the world’s last superpower.
Hezbollah’s Stand against Israel from within Lebanon. Hezbollah infiltrated and penetrated Lebanese society so Israel had to attack them by attacking innocent Lebanese. Overt military force served as blowback against the Israelis; bad media; no military gains; became a political failure. The Arab world recognized Israel’s weakness and believes Israel’s image of invincibility no longer exists.
Iran conducts covert activities via Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with impunity in Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, Africa, the Palestinian territories and a number of other locations. Iran is effectively engaging US military forces by proxy.
Proxy wars allow Iran to fight the US without direct attribution, to subvert US objectives without going to full-scale war for which it know it will lose. Proxy wars are economy of force operations both in terms of people and material. Proxy wars have the impact of a good sniper. One good sniper can hold back a company (~100 men) or battalion (~500 men) under the right conditions; two snipers can instill fear in a city of millions, shut down highways and impact the economy and security such as the Washington DC snipers of 2002; proxy wars can have a similar impact but in an unconventional sense. Iran has an image of a nation that cannot be stopped because the international community is unwilling to do anything against it.
Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Iran supports and participates in proxy wars, Iran circumvents US and international sanctions, Iran successfully conducts political and psychological warfare without being punished. Iran understands that power and influence is more related to perception than reality.
To disrupt insurgent psychological dominance; COIN forces should find and exploit opportunities to unravel the insurgents’ ability to be effective as an organization. This first begins by severing/subverting his relationship with society. This creates the necessary foundation for stability and security to follow.
COIN forces can use direct and indirect means to disrupt the insurgents’ psychological dominance over the indigenous population in his area of operation. Direct means may be in the form of large presence patrols or other overt means. Indirect means may involve information operations or the use of proxies; meaning any efforts that are not overt.
Late 2008/early 2009, Israel used both overt and surreptitious means to attack Hamas in the Palestinian territories. In conjunction with surreptitious collaboration (infiltration) with some Palestinians, overt overwhelming military force was used against the populace-embedded Hamas. Media coverage and international condemnations coincided with the Israeli offensive. However, Israel knows the international body (United Nations) and other western nations do not truly hold any real power- if the international body cannot stop terrorists or non-state actors, they really cannot do much against nation-states like Israel. Israel recognized sanctions do not work; North Korea, Iraq and Iran were all under/remain under sanctions, but it never stopped any of them from achieving their goals or pressing forward their agendas. Knowing this, Israel persisted and punched through the enemy media/information operations barrier in a manner metaphorically comparable to the “Wizard of Oz”; of Toto going behind the curtain to reveal the Wizard who was manipulating the perceptions of the world for self-gain. Israel was able to undermine and discredit the effectiveness of Hamas before the world by maintaining their resolve and focus. A number of press reports following the conflict also noted how some locals hated Hamas for their abuse of locals. Israel achieved some success in splitting Hamas from its popular support base, which was often coerced. Note however, that despite this success, Israel’s job is not yet finished if they or the United Nations do not replace the Hamas void with some type of sustainable governance that is good for everyone. If this is ignored, Hamas will simply regenerate, with new lessons learned, and come back to fight another day. In this case, Israel did not lose focus of their mission and intent; neither did Israel dither too much with policies or unproductive sentiment. Israel ignored the inept United Nations and international community by following the Royal Bank of Scotland’s slogan ‘Make it Happen’.
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Last night MEXDRUGCARTELS posted a summary of two articles regarding a report produced by two retired Army Generals, Barry McCaffrey and Dr Robert Scales, concerning the growing threat along the Texas/Mexico Border. That piece was titled, “Cartel Violence Heading North and Federal Government in “Deep Denial” According to Retired Army General”.
Here is the link to the actual report found on the Texas Department of Agriculture website that resulted in media attention, “Texas Border Security A Strategic Military Assessment September 2011.” You can also download a copy of the report here.
Here are a couple excerpts from the report: 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
TODD STAPLES
COMMISSIONER
September 26, 2011
Dear Fellow Texan:
I am pleased to deliver to you this important report entitled “Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment.” This report is the culmination of many efforts that started with rural farmers and ranchers bringing pleas for a secure border to me. The 82nd Texas Legislature recognized this critical issue and the numerous accounts of cross-border violence and tasked the Texas Department of Agriculture via House Bill 4, to conduct:
“an assessment of the impact of illegal activity along the Texas-Mexico border on rural landowners and the agriculture industry and working in conjunction with other appropriate entities to develop recommendations to enhance border security.”
In accomplishing this legislative directive, the Texas Department of Agriculture joined with the Texas Department of Public Safety to jointly commission retired four-star Army General Barry McCaffrey and retired Army Major-General Robert Scales for this unique and strategic assessment.
General Barry McCaffrey is the former Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under President Bill Clinton and former Commander of all U.S. troops in Central and South America. Major-General Robert Scales is the former Commandant of the United States Army War College.
The report offers a military perspective on how to best incorporate strategic, operational and tactical measures to secure the increasingly hostile border regions along the Rio Grande River. It also provides sobering evidence of cartel criminals gaining ground on Texas soil. As Texas continues to seek and deliver solutions to this attack on our nation’s sovereignty, I hope you will find this report enlightening and helpful in our collaborative efforts. We must continue this effort until the rights of property owners to live and work are upheld without threat of violence.
Sincerely yours,
Todd Staples
Another excerpt here (format slightly modified to fit on this page)…McCaffrey is a fine writer, his work is often very well done…easy to understand…excellent clarity on issues addressed.
The study by McCaffrey and Scales is 182 pages and begins with an executive summary. Here’s a small excerpt of that summary from a military perspective. OF SPECIAL NOTE, understand that McCaffrey is not a newbie to the overall drug issue, McCaffrey served as the 4th Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
TEXAS BORDER SECURITY: A STRATEGIC MILITARY ASSESSMENT
Executive Summary
During the past two years the state of Texas has become increasingly threatened by the spread of Mexican cartel organized crime. The threat reflects a change in the strategic intent of the cartels to move their operations into the United States. In effect, the cartels seek to create a “sanitary zone” inside the Texas border -- one county deep -- that will provide sanctuary from Mexican law enforcement and, at the same time, enable the cartels to transform Texas’ border counties into narcotics transshipment points for continued transport and distribution into the continental United States. To achieve their objectives the cartels are relying increasingly on organized gangs to provide expendable and unaccountable manpower to do their dirty work. These gangs are recruited on the streets of Texas cities and inside Texas prisons by top-tier gangs who work in conjunction with the cartels.
Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of Conflict
The authors of this report, both retired senior military executives bring more than 80 years
of military and governmental service to their perspective on Texas border security viewed in terms of the classic levels of conflict: strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic
America’s fight against narco-terrorism, when viewed at the strategic level, takes on the classic trappings of a real war. Crime, gangs and terrorism have converged in such a way that they form a collective threat to the national security of the United States. America is being assaulted not just from across our southern border but from across the hemisphere and beyond. All of Central and South America have become an interconnected source of violence and terrorism. Drug cartels exploit porous borders using all the traditional elements of military force, including command and control, logistics, intelligence, information operations and the application of increasingly deadly firepower. The intention is to increasingly bring governments at all levels throughout the Americas under the influence of international cartels.
Operational
In the United States the operational level of the campaign against cartel terrorism is manifested at the state. Texas has become critical terrain and operational ground zero in the cartel’s effort to expand into the United States. Texas has an expansive border with drug cartels controlling multiple shipping lanes into the state. Texas’ location as the geographic center of the U.S. allows for easier distribution of drugs and people. In effect, the fight for control of the border counties along the Rio Grande has become the operational center of gravity for the cartels and federal, state and local forces that oppose them.
Tactical
At the tactical level of war the cartels seek to gain advantage by exploiting the creases between U.S. federal and state border agencies, and the separation that exists between Mexican and American crime-fighting agencies. Border law enforcement and political officials are the tactical focal point. Sadly, the tactical level is poorly resourced and the most vulnerable to corruption by cartels. To win the tactical fight the counties must have augmentation, oversight and close support from operational and strategic forces. History has shown that a common border offers an enemy sanctuary zone and the opportunity to expand his battlespace in depth and complexity. Our border with Mexico is no exception. Criminality spawned in Mexico is spilling over into the United States. Texas is the tactical close combat zone and frontline in this conflict. Texans have been assaulted by cross-border gangs and narco-terrorist activities. In response, Texas has been the most aggressive and creative in confronting the threat of what has come to be a narco-terrorist military-style campaign being waged against them.
If you want another perspective of the drug war you are not hearing about from the Federal government or mainstream media Skim through, if not read the entire report.
“Complacency Kills”…is a quote and concept I first learned as a young Marine during studies on Terrorism and as an Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Instructor. You have to have the mind and agility of a hunter, or you may end up as someone else’s meal.
Note: Sources are hyperlinked.
Cheers, 
Comment: Report documents an incident regarding police corruption
MEXICO CITY — Federal police arrested a state police officer Thursday in connection with last week’s arson fire at a casino that killed 52 people in northern Mexico.
Source: State police officer detained in Mexico casino arson that killed 52 - The Washington Post
Blogger Labels: Mexico,Police,Corruption,Mexican,Officer,Casino,Fire,Monterey,Comment,Report,incident,Federal,connection,arson,Source,State,Washington,Post
Comment: What’s important to take away from this piece?
Excerpt: Mexico gov opens corruption probe in deadly fire
By ELLIOT SPAGAT, Associated Press – 1 hour ago
MONTERREY, Mexico (AP) — A casino fire that killed 52 people in the northern city of Monterrey has put new pressure on the government to regulate a rapidly growing gambling industry that many Mexicans believe is vulnerable to corruption, money laundering and extortion.
The state of Nuevo Leon, where Monterrey is located, launched a new offensive Wednesday against casinos as a videotape was released of the brother of the city's mayor taking wads of cash inside an unidentified gambling establishment days before last week's deadly arson attack.
Mexico's gaming boom has occurred under the administration of President Felipe Calderon, which has led a bloody crackdown on organized crime. The Calderon government says it has not approved a single casino permit since he took office in late 2006 and blames judges for issuing injunctions to allow gambling halls to operate outside of local authority.
…
"The pace of growth has been very fast, outstripping the authorities' ability to enforce the existing regulations, including prosecuting those who are operating without the necessary permits," David Elizaga, Codere's chief financial officer, said during a conference call with investors last week.
Gambling businesses must report their earnings to Mexico's tax agency, which industry experts say has had trouble monitoring the income of legal operations, let alone illegal ones.
Some 700 soldiers, federal police and tax agents raided 11 casinos and confiscated more than 3,500 machines in Monterrey and Mexico City over the weekend, an operation the tax agency said was part of its regular enforcement…
Read Full Article: The Associated Press: Mexico gov opens corruption probe in deadly fire
Comment: This article is too good not to read in its entirety. Why? Because the techniques and tactics described here are similar to what one would find in insurgency environments; you have government penetrations, government collusion, extortion, infiltration of government, society, economy, etc. You can also see how important perception management and control is to the cartel via their heavy reliance on propaganda. These activities are also what one will find in underground movements. End comment.
Feed: Borderland Beat
Posted on: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 12:37 AM
Author: Ovemex
Subject: Mexico details La Familia extortion practices
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