The excerpt below highlights one of those key conditions, and it goes beyond Mexico by addressing the general nature of the problem normally faced in such enviornments whether they be insurgency, criminal or gang.
*The excerpt comes from a small manual written on counterinsugency back in 2008 and published in 2009, "Notes of a Counterinsurgent".
Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment
“In war the moral is to the material three to one”
-Napoleon
Whoever dominates the psychological terrain controls the fight. Counterinsurgent (COIN) forces want to dominate this terrain-it influences the population to choose a side - the insurgent or counterinsurgent.
Winning and security is based more on perception vice reality. Enemies of western powers understand national power is really more of an image in that the full might of military power is restricted from being fully implemented due to internal and international pressures-this gives insurgents the will to prevail.
From a “SO WHAT” perspective, enemies of western powers understand they can win by draining resolve to continue the fight. Western powers have large, obese and lethargic bureaucratic processes that render them quite useless- this makes time an insurgent weapon. Western powers have internal competing agendas to fund/support a war, or not. Insurgents will exploit the political seams via propaganda and other informational/perceptual means to foment internal political dissonance and indecisiveness- the insurgent isolates deployed COIN forces from his people and government. Additionally, western powers have big expensive sticks insurgents know they will not use- this make Rules of Engagement (ROE) an insurgent weapon.
Insurgents will shape the perceptual domain to ensure the indigenous population sees the insurgents as omnipotent and omniscient, and that there will be hell to pay afterwards if the population does not support them in their fight against the counterinsurgent.
Disenfranchised Sunnis initially led the Iraqi resistance in 2003 due to the US uprooting their infrastructure and undermining what order that was preexisting in the country rather that try to preserve infrastructure. Backed into a corner, along with an uncertain future, they began to fight. The lack of cohesiveness of the movement gave way to the insurgent/terrorist organization al Qaida in Iraq who successfully led a campaign of terrorist attacks against the U.S. for roughly three years. Their effectiveness in terms of gaining popular support to fight the US, along with successful media-backed international recruitment efforts, culminated with the perception in 2005 that Iraq was unwinnable to US forces. The perception the US was out to destroy the Sunni, mostly due to the Coalition Provisional Authorities de-Ba’athification effort, gave birth to the Iraqi Sunni resistance- there was no fully functioning constituted Iraqi government at the time. The Sunni were trying to push out an occupation force.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists waged campaigns of violence against those cooperating with counterinsurgent forces in Iraq. This prevented the local population from speaking out. AQI penetrated social infrastructure, economic and security mechanisms. Iraqis felt the psychological pressure of being watched from every direction and often preferred to collude with AQI to survive, knowing the counterinsurgent was not likely going to hurt them without cause. Iraqi fears of AQI became amplified when locals realized they were being released from prison due to lack of evidence only to come back and seek vengeance against those who reported them in the first place- Iraqi’s felt working with COIN forces was a futile effort. This gave AQI, at minimum, a tacit support structure to sustain operations.
Mexico 2008-2009. Press reports government of Mexico is failing in its ability to manage the narco-terrorist problem in their country that resulted in the deaths approximately 7000 people for 2008 alone; ~1000 within the first three months of 2009. Although the killings are mainly directed at competing cartel members, cartel members are killing, co-opting and bribing local officials. Cartel members are also targeting family members of competing cartel members to draw out competitors…killing the innocent and widening the death toll. These actions have so undermined the perception of security and stability in many areas of Mexico that locals are afraid of reporting illicit activities for fear of being killed. The impacts of the cartels activities resonated from being a local problem to an international problem and concern. The cartels have more money and better weapons than government agencies. Honest policemen are being threatened to cooperate with the cartels or they/their families will be tortured and killed. United States government officials, and some agencies, see the localized instability is causing a potential strategic problem. Some see Mexico as a failing state because the narco-terrorists are able to conduct operations with impunity. Mexicans do not trust local law enforcement because of perceptions of corruption…social chaos remains. This problem continues to fester. The cartel’s psychological dominance of their battle space allows them to continue operations with little resistance.
Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri survived numerous attacks while able to change the way of life in the U.S. in 2001; a country with over a ¼ billion people at the time. They changed US laws; undermined the US stock market, forced the creation of multiple new agencies- all done by 19 people. Some see al Qaeda as leading a global resistance movement to disrupt US influence. The psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks show what impacts 19 people can have on the world’s last superpower.
Hezbollah’s Stand against Israel from within Lebanon. Hezbollah infiltrated and penetrated Lebanese society so Israel had to attack them by attacking innocent Lebanese. Overt military force served as blowback against the Israelis; bad media; no military gains; became a political failure. The Arab world recognized Israel’s weakness and believes Israel’s image of invincibility no longer exists.
Iran conducts covert activities via Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with impunity in Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, Africa, the Palestinian territories and a number of other locations. Iran is effectively engaging US military forces by proxy.
Proxy wars allow Iran to fight the US without direct attribution, to subvert US objectives without going to full-scale war for which it know it will lose. Proxy wars are economy of force operations both in terms of people and material. Proxy wars have the impact of a good sniper. One good sniper can hold back a company (~100 men) or battalion (~500 men) under the right conditions; two snipers can instill fear in a city of millions, shut down highways and impact the economy and security such as the Washington DC snipers of 2002; proxy wars can have a similar impact but in an unconventional sense. Iran has an image of a nation that cannot be stopped because the international community is unwilling to do anything against it.
Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Iran supports and participates in proxy wars, Iran circumvents US and international sanctions, Iran successfully conducts political and psychological warfare without being punished. Iran understands that power and influence is more related to perception than reality.
To disrupt insurgent psychological dominance; COIN forces should find and exploit opportunities to unravel the insurgents’ ability to be effective as an organization. This first begins by severing/subverting his relationship with society. This creates the necessary foundation for stability and security to follow.
COIN forces can use direct and indirect means to disrupt the insurgents’ psychological dominance over the indigenous population in his area of operation. Direct means may be in the form of large presence patrols or other overt means. Indirect means may involve information operations or the use of proxies; meaning any efforts that are not overt.
Late 2008/early 2009, Israel used both overt and surreptitious means to attack Hamas in the Palestinian territories. In conjunction with surreptitious collaboration (infiltration) with some Palestinians, overt overwhelming military force was used against the populace-embedded Hamas. Media coverage and international condemnations coincided with the Israeli offensive. However, Israel knows the international body (United Nations) and other western nations do not truly hold any real power- if the international body cannot stop terrorists or non-state actors, they really cannot do much against nation-states like Israel. Israel recognized sanctions do not work; North Korea, Iraq and Iran were all under/remain under sanctions, but it never stopped any of them from achieving their goals or pressing forward their agendas. Knowing this, Israel persisted and punched through the enemy media/information operations barrier in a manner metaphorically comparable to the “Wizard of Oz”; of Toto going behind the curtain to reveal the Wizard who was manipulating the perceptions of the world for self-gain. Israel was able to undermine and discredit the effectiveness of Hamas before the world by maintaining their resolve and focus. A number of press reports following the conflict also noted how some locals hated Hamas for their abuse of locals. Israel achieved some success in splitting Hamas from its popular support base, which was often coerced. Note however, that despite this success, Israel’s job is not yet finished if they or the United Nations do not replace the Hamas void with some type of sustainable governance that is good for everyone. If this is ignored, Hamas will simply regenerate, with new lessons learned, and come back to fight another day. In this case, Israel did not lose focus of their mission and intent; neither did Israel dither too much with policies or unproductive sentiment. Israel ignored the inept United Nations and international community by following the Royal Bank of Scotland’s slogan ‘Make it Happen’.
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